Andrew Tucker Weighs In on Ceasefire, UN Plans and Israel’s Security Fears
The future of Gaza is back in the global spotlight. On Thursday, the UN Security Council is set to discuss new plans for an international role in governing and rebuilding the territory. On paper, it sounds like a step toward order and reconstruction. But is there any realistic solution that Israel can actually live with?
In a recent studio conversation, lawyer Andrew Tucker, director of a think tank specializing in international law and Israel, unpacked the ceasefire, the Trump-brokered agreement, and the emerging UN plan. His conclusions are cautious at best—and deeply skeptical at times.
A Quiet Front – But Under Heavy Pressure
Recent weeks have seen a relatively calm period under the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. But this quiet is not accidental. According to Tucker, it is largely the result of strong pressure from the United States—pressure directed mainly at Hamas, not at Israel.
The agreement reached about a month ago, he explains, is “very friendly” to Israel in one crucial respect:
For the first time, there is broad international consensus—both from the U.S. and key Arab states—that Hamas must be dismantled and demilitarized.
That kind of language has never appeared so clearly in earlier ceasefires, either in the last two years or before the October 7 attacks. From Israel’s perspective, that shift is new—and undeniably positive.
Is the Ceasefire Agreement Being Honored?
So far, Israel has largely kept its side of the bargain. The main obligation was to withdraw from significant parts of the Gaza Strip back toward the so-called “yellow line,” leaving Israel in control of roughly half of the territory. Apart from limited incursions into Gaza City to deal with specific threats, Tucker notes that Israel is broadly adhering to the framework.
Hamas, however, has fallen short. Under the agreement, it was required to release all hostages and return the bodies of those killed. While several bodies have been handed back in recent days—including that of Arik Gorenian, whose remains were held in Gaza for 11 years—four bodies are still believed to be inside the Strip.
Tucker is cautious about predicting whether those last remains will ever be returned:
- Hamas may not know exactly where all the bodies are.
- Other groups, not just Hamas, were involved in the October 7 attacks and in taking bodies back into Gaza.
This fragmented landscape makes fulfilment of the agreement far more complicated than a simple “Hamas vs Israel” narrative might suggest.
Most seriously, Tucker stresses, Hamas is not laying down its arms. It is not giving up its weapons, and that, he says, is “the major problem.”
The UN’s “Stabilization Force”: What Does It Actually Mean?
The UN Security Council meeting on November 13 will center on implementing parts of a U.S.-brokered agreement through a Security Council resolution. The idea is to give the process international legitimacy.
Tucker explains that:
- The resolution is likely under Chapter VI (non-binding), not Chapter VII (binding enforcement).
- Even so, a Security Council resolution gives a degree of political authority to what follows.
One key element of the plan is the creation of a “Board of Peace” that will oversee the political process, including the establishment of an international stabilization force in Gaza.
Much of this, he notes, is still vague:
- We do not know which countries will contribute troops.
- The exact mandate and rules of engagement are not yet clear.
The stated intent, however, is straightforward:
- Demilitarize Hamas.
- Deploy an international force to maintain security.
- Establish a technocratic, non-Hamas-affiliated interim government in Gaza.
- Only then move toward reconstruction.
But as Tucker points out, the devil is in the details—and none of those details are resolved.
Who Will Make Up the Stabilization Force?
The stabilization force is expected to draw from countries already involved in the broader agreement. According to Tucker, that likely includes:
- Egypt
- Israel
- Qatar
- Potentially Turkey, which has played an active role and is pushing hard to be included
Here Israel draws a sharp line. Jerusalem does not want Turkey in Gaza. Tucker explains why:
- The current regime under President Erdoğan is seen as deeply hostile to Israel.
- Turkey is closely aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood—the movement that originally created Hamas.
For Israel, the nightmare scenario is an “international” presence that, in practice, ends up rebuilding or sheltering a Hamas-like structure—this time with international legitimacy stamped on top.
“That’s the worst outcome Israel could face,” Tucker warns: not just Hamas reborn, but Hamas reborn with a UN-backed umbrella above it.
Can Hamas Really Be Demilitarized?
Reconstruction of Gaza’s shattered infrastructure is urgently needed. But Tucker is clear that, in the agreed sequence, demilitarization comes first.
No one, he says bluntly, has yet worked out how to achieve that.
- What does demilitarization mean in practice?
- Does it include destroying all tunnels?
- Removing every weapon?
- Who physically goes in and does this?
Trump has said, “We will act,” but, as Tucker notes, the U.S. has never actually carried out this kind of operation on the ground in Gaza—and has little appetite to put “boots on the ground” to fight Hamas directly.
If neither the U.S. nor other states are willing to do the “dirty work,” two unattractive options remain:
- Containment:
Marginalize Hamas into a smaller portion of the Strip and fence it off—leaving around two million Gazans in what would essentially be an isolated, unstable enclave. - Full Demilitarization by Force:
A complete dismantling of Hamas’s tunnel networks, weapons stockpiles and command structures—something that so far only Israel has shown both the will and capacity to attempt.
Neither path offers an easy, humane, or clearly successful model.
The Palestinian Authority: A Viable Alternative?
Could the Palestinian Authority (PA) in Ramallah take over Gaza? Tucker is unconvinced.
He traces the PA’s origins back to the Oslo Accords—an arrangement between Israel and the PLO, dominated by Fatah. Since then, the PA has struggled with:
- Deep internal divisions in the West Bank
- Accusations of corruption, with large sums allegedly funneled into the hands of President Abbas, his family and allies
- A lack of genuine legitimacy among many Palestinians
- Continued commitment by factions within the PA to violence against Israel
Given these realities, Tucker says, Israel is highly unlikely to accept the PA as the governing authority in Gaza.
The current agreement therefore gives the PA no formal role—only the theoretical possibility of involvement “down the road” if it reforms itself. For now, the proposed interim authority focuses on technocratic leaders from Gaza who are not affiliated with Hamas, though finding enough such figures will be challenging.
Is There a Bright Future for Gaza?
When asked directly whether he sees a bright future in the current plans—the ceasefire, the UN resolution, the potential role of the PA—Tucker is candid: he is “highly skeptical.”
He sees Trump’s broader vision as a grand attempt to remake the Middle East through agreements that create a new status quo, backed by massive financial interests. But from Israel’s perspective, the question is simpler and sharper:
Will this create a truly secure environment for the Jewish state?
As long as key players in the process remain fundamentally opposed to Israel’s existence within secure borders, Tucker fears the answer will be no. The continuing existence of Hamas—or similar entities—guarantees that Israel will remain on the defensive, forced into recurrent military confrontation.
The wider package appears to touch the West Bank as well, with talk of Judea and Samaria and East Jerusalem forming part of a future Palestinian state—possibly as a condition from Saudi Arabia for fully joining the Abraham Accords. That, Tucker warns, could become a major challenge for Israel’s long-term security.
“The game is not over,” he concludes. The plans on the table may be ambitious, but the realities on the ground remain stubborn and complex.